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Abuse of Right in Quebec: Some 40 Years Later 
Jean-Louis Baudouin 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Alain Levasseur has taught and written extensively in the 
area of the civil law of obligations. The framework and general principles 
of both Louisiana and Quebec civil law are drawn from the same Latino-
Germanic tradition and heritage. Yet their evolution in many areas has been 
different due to distinctive cultural and social characteristics. 
American common law jurisdictions have clearly influenced Louisiana 
private law. The situation in Quebec, however, has been slightly different. 
Due to the persistence of the use of the French language, the doctrinal and 
jurisprudential impact of continental law—particularly that of France—has 
always played an important role. Yet Louisiana, due to the existence of a 
civil code and a well-implanted Roman tradition, remains with Quebec 
and Haiti as one of the only continental-related jurisdictions in North 
America.1  
In Quebec, the law of contract has seen a remarkable evolution since 
the adoption of the new Quebec Civil Code in 1994. Large discretionary 
power to control contractual relationships was given to the courts, and 
most of the new rules were specifically designed to increase and promote 
equity, fair dealing, consumer protection, and good faith in contractual 
matters.2 The doctrine of abuse of right also underwent profound and 
significant changes. 
Abuse of right generally covers three different situations. The first is 
the area of contracts. In that respect, in 1994, the Quebec legislature 
codified a number of protective measures that had already been, in certain 
circumstances, previously only initiated by the courts.3 The second is that 
of property rights. By contrast, the evolution in that case has clearly been 
the task of the courts based on the specific adoption by the Civil Code of 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2016, by JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN. 
  Counsel Fasken, Matineau, DuMoulin, Associate Professor, Faculty of 
Law, University of Montréal. 
 1. Continental-related jurisdictions are jurisdictions that draw their civil law 
from the Romanist continental tradition. 
 2. For an overview, see Jean-Louis Baudouin, Justice et équilibre: la nouvelle 
moralité contractuelle du droit civil québécois, in LE CONTRAT AU DÉBUT DU XXIE 
SIÈCLE: ÉTUDES OFFERTES À JACQUES GHESTIN 29–44 (L.G.D.J. ed., 2001). 
 3. JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN, PIERRE-GABRIEL JOBIN & NATHALIE VÉZINA, 
LES OBLIGATIONS no. 156, at 255 (7th ed. 2013). 
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1994 of the theory of abuse of right in two distinct articles.4 Finally, the 
third general area relates to judicial matters in general—cases where the 
system of justice is used to seek revenge, to intimidate litigants, or, in other 
words, situations where the civil or criminal justice systems are misused.5 
In this particular case, however, the evolution is mostly due to legislative 
intervention.6 
In 1974, Judge Albert Mayrand of the Quebec Court of Appeal 
participated in a conference at the Louisiana Institute of Civil Law Studies 
at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University. The 
Louisiana Law Review later published the Article that Judge Mayrand 
submitted for this conference.7 In that Article, he drew a portrait of the 
existing French and Quebec law on abuse of right.8 
The purpose of this short Essay in honor of Professor Alain Levasseur 
is to show how not only the law but also the very concept of abuse of right 
in property and judicial areas have drastically changed over the years. 
I. ABUSE OF RIGHT AND OWNERSHIP LAW  
Abuse of right in the exercise of the right of ownership as a tool to 
control good faith and equity in personal relationships originated in 
France.9 By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the notion of abuse of right was well known in 
Quebec.10 Yet until recently, doubt subsisted as to the very foundation of 
abuse of right.11 
                                                                                                             
 4. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 7 (Can.) (“No right may be 
exercised with the intent of injuring another or in an excessive and unreasonable 
manner, and therefore contrary to the requirements of good faith.”); id. at art. 976 
(“Neighbours shall suffer the normal neighbourhood annoyances that are not 
beyond the limit of tolerance they owe to each other, according to the nature or 
location of their land or local custom.”). 
 5. 1 JEAN-LOUIS BAUDOUIN, PATRICE DESLAURIERS & BENOÎT MOORE, LA 
RESPONSABILITÉ CIVILE no. 1-236, at 223 (8th ed. 2014). 
 6. J.L. BAUDOUIN, L’abus du droit d’ester en justice au Québec: valse 
d’hésitation entre le législateur et les juges, in LIBER AMICORUM, MÉLANGES EN 
L’HONNEUR DE CAMILLE JAFFRET-SPINOSI 53 (2013).  
 7. Albert Mayrand, Abuse of Rights in France and Quebec, 34 LA. L. REV. 
993 (1974). 
 8. See id. 
 9. PHILIPPE LE TOURNEAU ET AL., DROIT DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ ET DES 
CONTRATS - RÉGIMES D’INDEMNISATION no. 6863, at 1706 (10th ed. 2014). 
 10. See BAUDOUIN, supra note 6, no. 1-246, at 236. 
 11. See id. 
2016] ABUSE OF RIGHT IN QUEBEC 1187 
 
 
 
During that time, a vast majority of cases repeatedly held that abuse 
of right in ownership disputes was merely a specific illustration of the 
general rule of civil liability based on fault.12 In other words, the plaintiff 
had to prove to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant had been 
negligent. This was an easy burden to discharge when the damage had 
been intentional or caused by the effect of an obvious act of negligence 
showing wanton disregard for the rights of others.13 A few cases at the turn 
of the nineteenth century, however, had ruled that the liability involved in 
abuse of right cases was actually strict liability, and this liability existed 
when the right of ownership was used in an “antisocial way.”14 The simple 
existence of damage that the exercise of the right of ownership caused was 
enough to create liability. By and large, however, courts did not follow 
these authorities. 
Katz v. Reitz, one of the seminal judgments of Judge Mayrand’s 
career, adopted the latter view.15 In Katz, Judge Mayrand came to the 
conclusion that the liability for the abusive use of one’s right of ownership 
was strict liability—meaning that the plaintiff did not need to prove fault, 
but rather simply prove that the exercise of the right had caused damages 
beyond a neighbor’s normal limit of tolerance.16 This decision, however, 
was not consistently followed. 
The situation changed dramatically in 2008 with the Supreme Court 
of Canada case Ciment du St-Laurent v. Barrette.17 In that case, Ciment du 
St-Laurent—a cement company—had been operating a plant over a long 
period of time, and it held all the necessary licenses, permits, and 
administrative authorizations required to operate the plant.18 The 
company’s operations, however, caused repeated and significant damage 
to neighbors, including pollution, dust, odors, noise, and unwanted 
debris.19 Between 1991 and 1995, the company had spent approximately 
$8 million to improve the dust collector machines, which served as proof 
                                                                                                             
 12. See id. 
 13. One example would be the case of the man who erected long poles to 
prevent the use of his neighbor’s airstrip. Air–Rimouski Ltée v. Gagnon Ltée, 
[1952] C.S. 149 (Can. Que.). Another example is the man who constructed a 
hideous fence to deprive his neighbor of sunshine. Brodeur v. Choinière, [1945] 
C.S. 334 (Can. Que.). 
 14. See Can. Paper Co. v. Brown, [1922] S.C.R. 243 (Can.); Dugas v. 
Drysdale, [1897] S.C.R. 20 (Can.). 
 15. Katz v. Reitz [1973] C.A. 230 (Can. Que.). 
 16. Id. at 237. 
 17. Barrette v. Ciment du St-Laurent Inc., [2008] S.C.R. 392 (Can.). 
 18. Id. para. 4. 
 19. Id. paras. 5–6. 
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that the company had done everything it could to reduce the damage 
caused by its operations.20 
In response to the ongoing nuisance caused by the company’s operations, 
a group of citizens brought a class action seeking compensation.21 The 
Superior Court22 held the defendant company liable, finding that although the 
company had done everything that it could to minimize the inconvenience 
caused by its operations, the evidence clearly showed that the prejudice the 
plaintiffs suffered largely exceeded the standard of an acceptable 
tolerance.23 The court also held that, because the right at issue was 
personal, the company’s liability extended to everyone who suffered 
damages and was not limited to owners of adjoining lands.24 Lessees, for 
example, also held the right to be compensated.25 Finally, the court 
confirmed the existing jurisprudence to the effect that all administrative 
authorizations and operation permits did not confer legal immunity.26 
The Court of Appeal27 rejected the strict liability theory and held that 
Ciment du St-Laurent was at fault and that its liability was to be assessed 
on that basis.28 As far as the nature of abuse of right is concerned, the 
appellate court found that the obligation was not a personal right but a right 
in rem.29 In other words, the neighborhood created a real obligation of each 
property to the others, essentially a sort of servitude. An important 
consequence was that any recourse by persons other than those holding a 
right of ownership was therefore excluded.30 
The Supreme Court of Canada overturned the Court of Appeal and 
reinstated the findings of the Superior Court.31 In a lengthy and elaborate 
unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court held that Article 976 of the Civil 
Code of Quebec created strict liability in this circumstance, irrespective of 
any fault or negligence.32 The defendant company was liable on the sole 
basis that the levels of inconvenience and disturbance that it caused 
exceeded those that would be generally acceptable under the 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. para. 7. 
 21. Id. para. 8. 
 22. Barrette v. Ciment du St-Laurent Inc., [2003] R.J.Q. 1883 (Can. Que.). 
 23. Id. at paras. 305–15. 
 24. Id. at paras. 344–49.  
 25. Id. at paras. 350–57. 
 26. Id. at paras. 382–90. 
 27. Barrette v. Ciment du St-Laurent Inc., [2006] R.J.Q. 2633 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 28. Id. at paras. 214–22. 
 29. Id. at paras. 177–84. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Barrette v. Ciment du St-Laurent Inc., [2008] S.C.R. 392, para. 3 (Can.). 
 32. Id. paras. 37–96. 
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circumstances.33 The degree of tolerance due by neighbors therefore remained 
a question of fact to be assessed by courts in each specific circumstance.34 
The essence of the Supreme Court reasoning can be found in the 
following passage:  
Even though it appears to be absolute, the right of ownership has 
limits. Article 976 C.C.Q. establishes one such limit in prohibiting 
owners of land from forcing their neighbours to suffer abnormal 
or excessive annoyances. This limit relates to the result of the 
owner’s act rather than to the owner’s conduct. It can therefore be 
said that in Quebec civil law, there is, in respect of neighbourhood 
disturbances, a no-fault liability regime based on art. 976 C.C.Q. 
which does not require recourse to the concept of abuse of rights 
or to the general rules of civil liability. With this form of liability, 
a fair balance is struck between the rights of owners or occupants 
of neighbouring lands.35 
A number of collateral issues have not yet been resolved by the 
Quebec case law. An important one is whether the plaintiff must prove 
that the events leading to the alleged abuse are not merely isolated but have 
a certain degree of recurrence. Recently, the Court of Appeal held that the 
recurrence of the act, although not a determining condition to liability, was 
nevertheless an important element that ought to be taken with 
consideration by courts together with the objective character of its 
seriousness.36 As well, a number of cases have now allowed parties that 
are not the owners of adjoining lands—such as lessees, persons who have 
worked on the premises, etc.—to benefit from the action for abuse of 
right.37 The finding of the Canadian Supreme Court will certainly have a 
direct and profound impact on environmental protection as courts have 
witnessed a dramatic increase of demands for compensation in recent 
years.38 
II. ABUSE OF RIGHT AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS  
Courts in Quebec have always sanctioned clearly abusive use of 
judicial proceedings motivated by vengeance or clear disregard for the 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. paras. 87–96. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. para. 86. 
 36. Plantons A et P Inc. v. Delage, [2015] QCCA 7 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 37. See, e.g., Larue v. TVA Prods. Inc., [2011] QCCS 5493 (Can. Que.). 
 38. BAUDOUIN, supra note 6, no. 1-259, at 251. 
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system of justice.39 Overall, however, they have always been very shy to find 
liability and have not been very creative in that respect. For a long period of 
time, judicial intervention was indeed limited to two specific instances. The 
first instance concerned a plaintiff who had used the judicial system with clear 
intent to cause damage to the other party; in other words, a vexatious or 
frivolous state of mind was present.40 The second instance, which was much 
more limited, occurred when the plaintiff had no sustainable right in law, even 
if there was no real intent to cause prejudice.41 As one can well imagine, 
getting relief in this particular situation was much more problematic, and the 
burden of proof was not easy to discharge. Courts were thus generally 
reluctant to impose sanctions for the misuse of the judicial system in the 
absence of clear and convincing evidence of clearly futile or vexatious 
behavior, and the standard of fault the courts required was very high.42  
In recent years, however, a new form of abusive conduct—best known 
as SLAPP43—became an increasing concern. SLAPP was designed to 
restrain or totally prevent the right of free speech by using defamation or 
injunctive remedies against people who did not have the emotional or 
financial support to meet the challenge.44 
One should also note that courts were reluctant, when abusive behavior 
was found, to order the losing party to pay the other party’s attorney’s fees 
and additional litigation costs not directly covered by law as court costs. In a 
controversial decision, for example, the Court of Appeal held that there was 
no causal connection between the abusive conduct and the reimbursement of 
attorney’s fees, and that the courts could only consider the fees as a direct 
damage in exceptional circumstances.45 The legal community criticized this 
judgment on the grounds that the distinction between abuse of right related 
to the legal question raised and abuse of right related to the very use of the 
judicial system was artificial, and that the appellate court’s decision 
                                                                                                             
 39. See id. no. 236, at 223. 
 40. See, e.g., St-Amour v. Peterson, [1998] R.R.A. 103 (Can. Que.); 
Moisescu v. Garmaise, [1993] R.R.A. 587 (Can. Que.). 
 41. Victor Parent Inc. v. Cie Found. du Can., [1996] R.R.A. 738 (Can. Que.). 
 42. BAUDOUIN, supra note 6, no. 1-235, at 222. 
 43. A SLAPP lawsuit is “[a] strategic lawsuit against public participation – 
that is, a suit brought by a developer, corporate executive, or elected official to 
stifle those who protest against some type of high-dollar initiative or who take an 
adverse position on a public-interest issue (often involving the environment).” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1514 (9th ed. 2009). 
 44. Savoie v Thériault- Martel, [2015] QCCA 591 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 45. Entreprises Immobilières du Terroir Ltée v. Viel, [2002] R.J.Q. 1262 
(Can. Que. C.A.). 
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seriously decreased the opportunity to sanction a large number of abusive 
conducts.46  
The conservative approach of the jurisprudence is probably one of the 
main reasons why the legislature intervened. In 2009, the legislature 
enacted a series of rules in the Code of Civil Procedure that considerably 
increased the power of courts and extended the remedies available against 
abusive proceedings.47 
According to Article 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure, courts at any 
time, either on demand or on their own initiative, can declare any proceeding 
or judicial demand abusive in whole or in part.48 Importantly, the notion of 
abuse is defined in a very broad way and includes proceedings that are 
unfounded, frivolous, intended to delay the judicial process, vexatious, or 
quarrelsome.49 These amendments are also designed to protect against 
SLAPP procedures restricting the right of free speech in matters of general 
social interest. After hearing the parties on a motion to declare the procedure 
abusive, the court can take any one or more of the following five actions: (1) 
impose conditions to the continuance of further proceedings; (2) require 
specific undertakings from the parties for the orderly conduct of the 
procedure; (3) stay the proceeding in whole or in part; (4) recommend special 
management of the case; or (5) order the abusive party to pay to the other a 
provision for costs.50 
Additionally, the court can also order compensation of the aggrieved 
party, which can include legal costs, general damages, lawyer’s professional 
fees, expert disbursements, and punitive damages.51 In a recent case that the 
Quebec Court of Appeal confirmed, a judge held the owner of a senior 
residence who had brought a SLAPP action in defamation against the 
daughter of a resident to pay a penalty of $200,000.52 Since the amendments 
to the Code of Civil Procedure, courts have been very proactive, and the 
number of reported cases is staggering, as courts now feel more comfortable 
with a legislative framework supporting their intervention.53 
                                                                                                             
 46. BAUDOUIN, supra note 6, no. 1-348, at 389. 
 47. Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 2009, c. C-25, arts. 54.1 to 54.6 (Can.). 
As of 2016, these articles are now designated as article 51 et seq. of the new Code 
of Civil Procedure. 
 48. Id. art. 54.1. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. art. 54.3. 
 51. See id. art. 54.4. 
 52. Savoie v. Thériault-Martel, [2015] QCCA 591 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 53. See Raphaël Lescop, Revue analytique de la jurisprudence portant sur les 
articles 54.1 à 54.6 du Code de procédure civile: du 4 juin 2009 au 4 juin 2012, 
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CONCLUSION 
If one compares the law today to the state of the law at the time Judge 
Mayrand wrote his Article, one can only come to the conclusion that in the 
last 41 years, the development of the abuse of right theory in Quebec, by 
both the legislature and the courts, has been simply spectacular. In all both 
instances of property matters and judicial proceedings, however, this 
evolution is clearly indicative of a general trend in Quebec to introduce a 
higher level of equity, good faith, and social justice in human 
relationships. 
                                                                                                             
REPÈRES, Aug. 2012, at 1; RAPHAËL LESCOP, L’ABUS DE PROCÉDURE EN DROIT 
QUÉBÉCOIS: GUIDE PRATIQUE POUR L’AVOCAT PLAIDEUR (Yvon Blais ed., 2014). 
